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STATE-SPONSORED RELIGIOUS
DISPLAYS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
MARK L. MOVSESIANt
On June 22, 2012, the Center for Law and Religion proudly
hosted, together with the Department of Law at Libera
Universith Maria SS. Assunta (LUMSA), an international
conference, State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the U.S. and
Europe. Held at LUMSA's campus in Rome, Italy, the conference
brought together leading American and European scholars,
judges, and government officials to address the legality of public
religious displays in different nations. Professor Silvio Ferrari of
the University of Milan delivered the Conference Introduction.
Panels included Cultural or Religious? UnderstandingSymbols
in Public Places; The Lautsi Case and the Margin of
Appreciation; and State-Sponsored Religious Displays in
ComparativePerspective.
Questions about the public display of religious symbols are
very much in the air. In both the United States and Europe,
recent cases have addressed the permissibility of such displays.
In the United States, a fractured Supreme Court in 2010 allowed
display of a Latin cross as a war memorial in the Mojave Desert.
The Court decided the case, Salazar v. Buono,' on a procedural
point, but observers generally understood that the real issue in
the case was the constitutionality of the cross itself.2 Across the
Atlantic Ocean, the European Court of Human Rights in 2011
decided Lautsi v. Italy,' a challenge to Italy's practice of placing
t Frederick A. Whitney Professor and Director, Center for Law and Religion, St.
John's University School of Law. I thank my colleague Marc DeGirolami for helpful
comments.
1 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
2 Christopher C. Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment
Clause, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1387, 1390 (2011) ("The antecedent question behind
everything in Salazar is the constitutionality of the cross itself.").
3 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
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crucifixes in public school classrooms.
In a decision that
surprised many observers, the Grand Chamber held that display
of the crucifix was consistent with Italy's duty of religious
neutrality under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Salazar and Lautsi are two prominent examples of litigation
involving public religious displays, but similar cases recur all the
time. Public religious displays cause neuralgic controversies in
America and Europe, and, indeed, around the world. As Ferrari
writes in his contribution to this symposium, "conflicts around
religious symbols have acquired a global dimension and occur
with equal intensity in countries with profoundly different
cultural backgrounds, religious traditions, and political
institutions."' Millions of people see such displays as vital to a
sense of national identity-or, at worst, innocuous. For millions
of other people, however, state-sponsored religious symbols send
a message of exclusion and intolerance. The debate seems
unlikely to end anytime soon.
From among the many fine papers presented at the
Conference, the editors of the Journal of Catholic Legal Studies
have selected four for publication.
Ferrari's Conference
Introduction, State-Supported Display of Religious Symbols in
the Public Space, explores the complexity of the issue. Religious
symbols, like other symbols, may have multiple, even conflicting
meanings. For example, observers could reasonably understand
a woman's veil to be a symbol of piety, or oppression, or even a
fashion statement. And the woman herself might intend the veil
to mean something else entirely. Should we therefore give up on
legal solutions and leave the matter to politics? No, Ferrari
responds: We should undertake a careful analysis of the setting
where the symbol is displayed. Relying on Jurgen Habermas's
distinction between "political" and "institutional public
sphere[s],"6 Ferrari argues that religious symbols should be
allowed in a public space that is open for debate-what we in
America would call a public forum-but not one where coercive
deliberations take place, like a courtroom.
Ferrari concedes that it will sometimes be difficult to
distinguish clearly between political and institutional public
spheres, and that, even within a clearly defined space, people act
4

Silvio Ferrari, State-Supported Display of Religious Symbols in the Public

Space, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 7, 9 (2013).

1 Id. at 17.
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in different capacities. In a public school, for example, we may
wish to allow greater freedom for students to display religious
symbols than for teachers. Everything, he argues, depends on
context: "[I]n some cases the neutrality that must characterize
the institutional public space requires the exclusion of religious
symbols, but .. . in other cases the same neutrality can be
ensured by the inclusion of a number of different religious
symbols in that space."' Crucially, all "stakeholders" should be
consulted. Even on those occasions when people cannot agree on
whether a symbol should be allowed, the very act of consultation
will prove beneficial.
In his contribution, Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols
Promote Religious Liberty?, Professor Thomas Berg of the
University of St. Thomas School of Law challenges the
conventional wisdom that public religious symbols are, at best,
merely consistent with religious liberty. On the contrary, he
says, state-sponsored displays "can actually support a vigorous
conception of religious liberty."' By suggesting a transcendent
authority higher than the state, such displays may remind
citizens that government, however powerful, has limits. The
sense of limitation and respect for a higher authority may benefit
not only members of the majority religion, he maintains, but
members of minority religions as well. Moreover, "official
religious expression may bolster religious freedom by affirming,
if only symbolically, that religious beliefs [including minority
beliefs] are relevant to public life."'
Berg recognizes that public religious displays have costs,
however. Such displays can trivialize piety, thus injuring the
very religious communities whose symbols are being displayed.
In addition, religious symbols may alienate citizens with
different religious commitments or none at all. In the end, he
argues, "[elven granting that officially endorsed religious symbols
attitude toward religious
can support a wholesome
wise to forego displaying
be
may
liberty .... the government
such symbols unless the potential benefits in religious freedom
are quite certain and cannot be achieved by other means."'
Id. at 20.
' Thomas Berg, Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols Promote Religious
Liberty?, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 23, 24 (2013).
8 Id. at 35.
9 Id. at 46.
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Professor Monica Lugato of LUMSA approaches the subject
from an interesting perspective that one does not typically
encounter in the law and religion literature. Her contribution,
The "Marginof Appreciation" and Freedom of Religion: Between
Treaty Interpretation and Subsidiarity, situates Lautsi in the
context of debates about international law, specifically, treaty
interpretation. In allowing display of the crucifix in Lautsi, the
Grand Chamber relied heavily on the so-called margin of
appreciation doctrine, which gives state parties a certain degree
of discretion in adapting the requirements of the European
Convention to local conditions. In Lautsi, for example, Italy had
discretion in determining how best to fulfill its duty of religious
neutrality in light of the enduring place of Catholicism in Italian
society.
The Grand Chamber's employment of the doctrine, in Lautsi
and elsewhere, has drawn much criticism. Many scholars view
the margin of appreciation concept as irredeemably vague, a
handy device for the Grand Chamber when it wishes to avoid
ruling against a state party. For her part, however, Lugato
defends the Grand Chamber's reliance on the doctrine. The
margin of appreciation, she maintains, "is inherent in
international human rights obligations"-like those contained in
the European Convention-for two reasons.' 0 First, the doctrine
follows from the standard international law rules on treaty
interpretation contained in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. Second, the doctrine represents a "logical
consequence []"" of the principle of subsidiarity, which permits
regional solutions to human rights problems only where local
authorities prove incapable of addressing them. With respect to
classroom religious displays, she believes, "the 'margin of
appreciation' and subsidiarity represent important tools to
accommodate effective protection of the right to religious freedom
and the right to education with due consideration of the place of
religion in any given society."12

1o Monica Lugato, The "Margin of Appreciation" and Freedom of Religion:
Between Treaty Interpretationand Subsidiarity, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 49, 53
(2013).

" Id. at 67.
12

Id. at 70.
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The final contribution comes from Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. He helpfully rounds out the symposium by providing the
perspective of a jurist who must decide cases on the legality of
public religious displays. In his paper, Religious Symbols and
the Law, he surveys important decisions from his own court,
including one, like Lautsi, concerning public display of a Latin
cross." In that case, Separationof Church and State Committee
v. City of Eugene, the Ninth Circuit held that display of a Latin
cross in a public park was unconstitutional under the Supreme
Court's "endorsement test," which forbids a state from acting in a
way that would suggest the state had endorsed religion." Judge
O'Scannlain concurred in the result, but argued that his
colleagues' reasoning was too sweeping. Judge O'Scannlain
insists that courts must pay close attention to context and avoid
categorical rules about public religious displays.
After discussing the American cases, Judge O'Scannlain
addresses the caselaw of the European Court, in particular, the
Lautsi decision. He undertakes a comparison of the approach of
these two jurisdictions to the problem of religious displays. Some
similarities exist: Just as the United States has moved away
from the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, which
would allow much more in the way of public religious displays
than the endorsement test, Europe, too, might be moving away
from the original understanding of the European Convention.
But he cautions against "drawing too close a connection" between
the American and European jurisprudence.' 5 American and
European courts work with different authoritative texts-the
European Convention does not have an Establishment Clause,
after all-and there are very different religious histories
involved.
Judge O'Scannlain's paper thus echoes a powerful point that
Ferrari, Berg, and Lugato make as well. When it comes to public
religious symbols, careful analysis of context is crucial. Different
legal regimes, the products of different cultures and histories,

1
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Religious Symbols and the Law, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL
STUD. 71, 71-72 (2013).
14 93 F.3d 617, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
'6 O'Scannlain, supra note 13, at 91.
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will naturally adopt different approaches to religious symbols.
Even within a single regime, a variety of responses may be
appropriate, depending on place, speaker, and other
circumstances. In this area, as in so many others in law and
religion, a rigid, categorical approach seems unwise."
In
highlighting the essentially contextual nature of the inquiryand in many other ways too-these very fine essays make an
important contribution to the literature.

See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored
ReligiousDisplays in the U.S. and Europe, 1 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 338 (2012).
17 See generally Marc 0. DeGirolami, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2013).
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